

**MARINE CORPS EMERGENCY ACTIONS CENTER**  
**Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps**  
**Washington 25, D. C.**

**SUMMARY OF ITEMS OF SIGNIFICANT INTEREST**

**PERIOD 010701 - 020700 OCTOBER 1962**

**I. ASIA**

a. A CINCUSARPAC SUMMARY REPORTS ON STEPPED-UP VIET CONG ACTIVITIES IN THE NORTHERN HIGHLANDS OF S. VIETNAM, OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE IS THE INCREASING AA THREAT. 3 U. S. HELOS WERE SHOT DOWN IN THE PAST MONTH AND ONE C-47 RECEIVED 30 HITS FROM GROUND FIRE ON 22 SEPTEMBER.

**CINCUSARPAC 290252Z (S)**

**2. MISCELLANEOUS**

a. CNO ADVISED CMC THAT CINCSTRIKE HAS REQUESTED THE DESIGNATION OF A SUITABLY QUALIFIED MARINE CORPS BRIGADIER GENERAL OR COLONEL AND A REAR ADMIRAL OR NAVY CAPTAIN FOR TEMPORARY DUTY IN CONNECTION WITH HIS STUDY OF TACTICAL AIR RECONNAISSANCE AND AERIAL BATTLEFIELD SURVEILLANCE AS DIRECTED BY THE JCS.

ALSO CINCSTRIKE REQUESTS THE CONDUCT OF A COMPREHENSIVE TACTICAL AIR RECONNAISSANCE AND AERIAL BATTLEFIELD SURVEILLANCE DEMONSTRATION DURING THE THIRD WEEK OF OCTOBER.

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**EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
REGRADING, DOD DIR 5200.10  
DOES NOT APPLY**

[REDACTED]

CNO SUGGESTS CONSIDERATION OF PHIBRIGLEX 62 AS THE  
VEHICLE FOR THE DEMONSTRATION.

(EAC NOTE: PHIBRIGLEX 62 IS A MAJOR PHIBLANT/FMFLANT  
EXERCISE FROM 15-30 OCTOBER. THE 4TH MEB WITH RLT-2 AND MAG-26  
WILL CONDUCT A LANDING ON VIEQUES.)

CNO 012247Z (C)

3. MOVEMENT

a. VMA-331 CURRENTLY DEPLOYED TO ROOSEVELT ROADS HAS  
POSITIONED 4 A4D-2 AIRCRAFT AT NAVAL BASE GUANTANAMO.

VMA-331 011605Z (C)

4. DEFCONS

a. NO CHANGE.

NMCC

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**00493**

**1962/10/02**

October 2, 1962

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 194

TO:           The Secretary of State  
              The Secretary of Defense  
              The Secretary of the Treasury  
              The Secretary of Commerce  
              The Secretary of Labor  
              The Administrator, Maritime Commission  
              The Director, Agency for International Development  
              The Director, Bureau of the Budget  
              The Director of Central Intelligence  
              The President, Commodity Credit Corporation

SUBJECT: Policy Toward Non-Bloc Ships in Cuban Trade  
(State memo of 10/2/62)

The President has approved the memorandum we\* discussed at the meeting this morning, including Alternative IV, under point 5. A group will be formed to do what is necessary to put these recommendations into effect. Mr. Abram Chayes, Legal Adviser of the State Department, will lead it. Will you arrange for your department to put an appropriate person in touch with Mr. Chayes?

Carl Kaysen

\* In some instances, departmental representatives were present representing their principals.

cc: Mrs. Lincoln  
     Mr. Bundy (3)✓  
     Mr. Kaysen  
     Mr. Johnson  
     NSC Files

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By <u>MLH</u>	NARS, Date <u>7/25/79</u>

**00494**

**1962/10/02**

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MEMORANDUM

DATE: October 2, 1962

TO: The Vice President

FROM: Colonel Burris

RE: Soviet Concern Over Cuba

Although Soviet officials apparently did not anticipate some of the reactions which their latest moves in Cuba have precipitated, they have recently become deeply concerned over the situation. Most of the concern, which is felt especially by Khrushchev, appears to stem from Soviet interest in the fundamental aspect of the Cuban experiment.

Certain Soviet officials, including Khrushchev, have revealed that the primary aim of Soviet policy in Cuba is to prevent a liquidation of the Castro regime since Cuba has been chosen as an example to Latin American countries that a Communist regime can survive in this hemisphere. The Soviet Union is determined to support and defend such an operation. The challenge to the Monroe Doctrine is implicit although in the Communist philosophy and jargon the operation is labeled defensive in nature. One of the dangers, therefore, is the clash of the prestige of the Soviet Union in this experiment with the prestige of the United States in defending traditional policies of the hemisphere.

In the absence of incidents, it is difficult to assess the extent to which the Soviets would go in open military support of the Castro regime. Khrushchev has made it clear that any attempt to blockade Soviet ships would be ignored by the Russians, and he has warned that he would use Soviet submarines and other military power to guarantee Soviet passage of the high seas. In the event of conflict between the United States and Cuba, the Soviets have threatened to come to the aid of Cuba. Russian soldiers have not been mentioned, although materiel and equipment have been promised the Cubans for use against U.S. attack bases, communications centers, etc. Yet the Soviets realize fully that the Cuban experiment could possibly involve major elements of U.S. military power and therefore lead to a much broader conflict. Since the Soviets still have a high regard for U.S. nuclear power, as well as a knowledge of the destruction which might eventually be delivered upon Russian soil, they may for these reasons exercise care and restraint in Cuba but limited only by the necessity for the Communist experiment in Cuba to succeed.

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By ing?, NARS, Date 4-20-81

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